But “We Owe It To Ourselves”

By Keith Weiner – Re-Blogged From http://www.Gold-Eagle.com

Have you ever heard someone say this? It falls into the category of, it’s so perverse, so wrong, and so wrong-headed that there has got to be a constituency out there somewhere, to assert this!

First, let’s head off at the pass the objection that the majority of US government debt is held by foreigners. As of March this year, the US Treasury estimates that $6.3 trillion worth of Treasury bills and bonds are owned by foreign holders. This is not even close to the majority of it.

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Death Of The Great Recovery (Part 2): The Second Coming Of Carmageddon

By David Haggith – Re-Blogged From http://www.Silver-Phoenix500.com

Like the disintegration of the formerly charmed stock market, the return of Carmageddon is right on schedule. I had stated early last year that one of the first cracks in our economy to become evident would be the crash of the car industry.

That crack materialized as promised, but then Hurricanes Harvey and Irma showed up to flood a million automobiles. Before any statistics materialized to show the economic impacts of those storms, I wrote the following revision for the dates of Carmageddon:

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Bad Bankers Drive Out Good Bankers: Wells Fargo, Wall Street, And Gresham’s Law

By John Rubino – Re-Blogged From Dollar Collapse

Back in the 1500s, a financial agent of Queen Elizabeth I named Thomas Gresham observed that that “bad money drives out good.” That is, if two kinds of money are circulating at the same legal value, people will spend the lower-quality money and save the higher. The latter as a result ceases to circulate. This became known as Gresham’s law.

More recently, in our book The Money Bubble, James Turk and I extended this concept to bankers, observing that in times of very easy money, bad bankers drive out good:

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Smaller Subprime Auto Lenders Are Folding as Losses Pile Up

By Bloomberg – Re-Blogged From Newsmax

Growing numbers of small subprime auto lenders are closing or shutting down after loan losses and slim margins spur banks and private equity owners to cut off funding.

Summit Financial Corp., a Plantation, Florida-based subprime car finance company, filed for bankruptcy late last month after lenders including Bank of America Corp. said it had misreported losses from soured loans. And a creditor to Spring Tree Lending, an Atlanta-based subprime auto lender, filed to force the company into bankruptcy last week, after a separate group of investors accused the company of fraud. Private equity-backed Pelican Auto Finance, which specialized in “deep subprime” borrowers, finished winding down last month after seeing its profit margins shrink.

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British Suddenly Stop Buying Cars

By Mark O’Byrne -Re-Blogged From http://www.Silver-Phoenix500.com

British people suddenly stopped buying cars

– Massive debt including car loans, very low household savings – Brexit and decline in sterling and consumer confidence impacts – New cars being bought on PCP by people who could not normally afford them – UK car business has ‘exactly the same problems’ as the mortgage market 10 years ago, according to Morgan Stanley – Bank of England is investigating to make sure UK banks are not overly exposed… – Prudent British people buying gold with cash, not cars with debt

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Did The Sub-Prime 2.0 Bubble Just Burst?

By Graham Summers – Re-Blogged From http://www.Gold-Eagle.com

We’ve been tracking the sub-prime auto-loan industry closely.

Our view is that this industry represents the worst of the worst excesses of our current credit bubble, much as the subprime mortgage industry represented the worst of the worst in excess for the Housing Bubble.

For this reason, we refer to sub-prime auto-loans as Subprime 2.0.

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How Can The Fed Possibly Unwind QE?

By Alasdair Macleod – Re-Blogged From http://www.Silver-Phoenix500.com

There are currently two important items on the Fed’s wish list. The first is to restore interest rates to more normal levels, and the second is to unwind the Fed’s balance sheet, which has expanded since the great financial crisis, principally through quantitative easing (QE). Is this not just common sense?

Maybe. It is one thing to wish, another to achieve. The Fed has demonstrated only one skill, and that is to ensure the quantity of money continually expands, yet they are now saying they will attempt to achieve the opposite, at least with base money, while increasing interest rates.

Both these aims appear reasonable if they can be accomplished, but the game is given away by the objective. It is the desire to return the Fed’s interest rate policies and balance sheet towards where they were before the last financial crisis, because the Fed wants to be prepared for the next one. Essentially, the Fed is admitting that its monetary policies are not guaranteed to work, and despite all the PhDs employed in the federal system, central bank policy remains stuck in a blind alley. Fed does not want to institute a normalised balance sheet just for the sake of it.

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